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Benjamin and Nichols
This week we will be discussing Benjamin’s famous article, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” and Nichols’s refiguring of the article, “The Work of Culture in the Age of Cybernetic Systems.” Both can be obtained via eReserves. Post your thoughts below.
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The story Nichols tells is one of power, ethics, and control — and language itself forms the struggle. In a time of technological transformation, human identity is at stake. We have come to define the human in relation to cybernetic systems, and thus the metaphor is taken as real and the simulation displaces reality. Nichols clearly exposes how humans are addicted to “the code of the visible” (40)… from judging life based on visual cues and life-support systems, to denying the player piano roll copyright protection because the text it embodied was not “visually perceptible to the human eye” (40).
In his comparison of mechanical reproduction with cybernetic simulations, Nichols reveals the potential dangers of simulations, and those dangers can be even more threatening because we are not always aware of them. One difference is that in cybernetic systems, “the concept of ‘text’ itself undergoes… slippage” (28). For the first time, text does not rely on a “substrate” (i.e., a base matter, a natural environment, or “supports” as Derrida would say). Another difference is that mechanical reproduction preserves the indexical relationship between the representation and the human lifeworld. Even though the camera was a transformative technology and it did demand new language and new conceptions of art, the photographic image necessarily attests to the “‘having been there’ of what it represents” as Barthes pointed out (Nichols 30). (aside: That might be oversimplified, since very early photographers would use non-cybernetic effects to doctor up pictures of circus “freak show” performers. Isn’t that a simulation?) In contrast to mechanical reproduction, cybernetic simulations can _replace_ “the experiential realm beyond their bounds” (34). This is the difference between remaking the world and effacing it (33). The danger of this difference is obvious when Nichols provides the excellent analogy of a zoo. In the zoo, we see the same animals that we would see in the wild, but they are out of context. Because the context is different, the gaze takes on new meanings and new language (34). (Though, he doesn’t specify examples of such new language.) For Nichols, it seems that “what is at stake” is the danger of the simulated zoo becoming the African savannah itself, and likewise we might feel in control of the actual savannah just as we are in control of the simulated one. The danger is when simulations become the lens through which we view and understand reality.
In the struggle for control over the systems that can simulate and even replicate human life, metaphors and rhetoric play a decisive role. Nichols explains how metaphors become more than metaphors in the legal arena. On a basic level the law, which is _nothing but_ speech acts, discovers many problems when it reaches into the cyber world. The cyber world denies the individual power of speech acts, since the simulated “I” and “you” etc. deny human intersubjectivity (30). In using the human metaphor for the computer and vice versa, and in using simulations as a metaphor for reality and vice versa, we run the risk that “conceptual metaphors [will] take on tangible embodiment,” namely in legal cases. In the Baby M example, the metaphor of human/computer is evident when babies are treated as engineered systems and commodities to be bought and sold (43). Nichols aptly concludes, “the justification for hierarchical control of the cybernetic apparatus takes a rhetorical form” (45). What has the potential to be transformative and disruptive is controlled and contained to an ideological struggle.
Nichols never hints at an alternative to the problems of language and metaphor. To think about thinking, and maybe even to think at all, we NEED metaphors. In the Google Makes Us Stoopid article, Nick Carr uses the metaphor of deep-water diving vs. speed-boating to describe his changing thought patterns. Even Nichols himself uses the metaphor of a landscape to write about the thought process (45). I just wonder if the focus of inquiry should not be on how to transgress or transcend the metaphors (46), but how to more ethically use the metaphors and operate within them. I don’t think it’s possible to transcend the cybernetic metaphor — a new metaphor will simply appear in its place to refigure our sense of reality, which MUST be mediated by language.
Photographs, paintings, orchestra concerts, and even books can never be reproduced perfectly, neither mechanically nor from the performer themselves. The author’s wide scope of arguments regarding mechanical reproduction in various media was interesting but could there be a form of art that is perfectly reproducible? Painting for example, can be viewed and enjoyed for what it is. The painting itself is an art with no means of assistance. Theatrical play is rehearsed and performed to the audience. But TV drama, or even a motion film is rehearsed but not directly performed to the audience. This is important because neither drama nor movie is never meant to hold any sort of authenticity or an orignality. Their birth and existence cannot be, until it gets reproduced. Whether it gets reproduced into a dvd, tv channel, or youtube clip, since it began with no original form, can it be that every reproduction of those art form is a perfect mechanical reproduction?
Benjamin’s argument for “the authenticity of a thing is the essence of all that is transmissible from its beginning,ranging from its substantive duration to its testimony to the history which it has exerperienced”. Although Benjamin uses the Cinema as a key to perceive or define man’s essences of culture (236); the historical tradition he speaks about in reference to authenticity, looses its grip. For Benjamin the Film is the metaphor to translate perception of art and translation of economics.
While Nichols, The Age of Cybernetics Systems, states the ubiquitous cybernetic systems act as metaphors for specific environmental or culture
simulations. One significant simulation was the Reagan’s SDI or “Star Wars (36-37)”. The simulation of war is “fought with a imaginary enemy”. Just as media which can be hypermedia so here the simulation or metaphor craves realism.
In “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” , I found the quote by Paul Vallery on the first page interesting. I agree with Valery’s statement that art “cannot remain unaffected by our modern knowledge and power”. This weekend I saw the exhibition “Take your time” by Olafur Eliasson at the Dallas Museum of Art. Eliasson combines light, modern materials and technology creating an immersive art experience for the visitor. Eliasson’s work is clearly affected by modern thinking. After seeing the art show, I thought there is so much more that can be done with modern materials and advanced technology while making a statement about social and political aspects of our world.
I also found the following quote interesting: “Even the most perfect reproduction of a work of art is lacking in one element: its presence in time and space”. This statement is quite accurate. If Ansel Adams took a picture and then shortly thereafter made a print from the negative, that print would be extremely valuable compared to another print made from the same negative if produced years later. A print made from that same negative by another person years after Ansel Adams’ death would be almost worthless. Incidentally, the most valuable object would be the negative because the negative is the original work of art, not the print because prints can be mass produced. This is why photographs are not actually works of art and why reproductions of artworks are not artworks in and of themselves. The author points this out by stating to make an “authentic” print from a negative does not make sense. So now that photography has been radically changed by the invention of the digital camera, which has ultimately eliminated film, the digital image can appear artistic but the digital image is therefore definitely not fine art.
I read “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” before The Work of
Culture in the “Age of Cybernetic Systems.” Bill Nichols makes reference to “The Work
of Art of Mechanical Reproduction”. Watler Benjamin wrote his article in 1936 which
caught me by surprise. As a reader you can view Benjamin as a futurist of his times with
political overtones. Benjamin’s article follows the history of photography and film as
works of art. Bolter and Grusin discuss the same stage of technology in Remediation
Understanding New Media. Benjamin’s theory of the aura of film was similar to the
theory of Bolter and Grusin’s theory of Remediation and immediacy where the goal of an
artist and the film maker is to erase the technology.
Bill Nichols Makes discusses several points Benjamin make in “The Work of Art in the
Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” Bill Nichols address the point of aura of a object and
the political connection. The political body is seems to take on characteristics of the
audience and the dictator (director). He talks about the choice of technology being apart
of the process. Nichols and Benjamin relate these ideas to the transformation of art for the
viewer. Also, McLuhan talks about the transition social affect of technology.
First, I had a rather difficult time trying to relate to most of Benjamin’s article. It is likely that it is because he is discussing technology as it was 80 years ago, so his analyses of different media and their effect seem a bit skewed to me (only because I, like Nichols, have different technology available for comparison). That said, I found Nichols’ article very engaging in its links drawn directly to modern technology – which helped me to better synthesize what Benjamin was trying to get across, not to mention answer a few questions I had. (see his simple explanation of “aura” and its connection to authenticity, p. 23, and his elaboration of why Benjamin seems so obsessed with he superiority of film, p.25).
I am, however, confused about whether Nichols is summarizing Benjamin or expressing his own thoughts (25) when he says that just as the “explosive, violent potential” of film must be diffused and muffled, the computer and cybernetic systems “must be diffused and contained by the industries of information which localise, condense and consolidate this potential democratization of power into hierarchies of control.” (25) If he is expressing his own ideas, why would democratization of computers’ potential be so horrible? Or is he being sarcastic since later he poses the idea that cybernetic systems could cause liberating changes in perception that could change the structure of capitalism? (26)
In Benjamin’s article: slightly foggy on his theories of what we accept as authentic (like painting v. film, where only the original painting will suffice, but in film, all copies are just a good because that is the end-product of the process that is film, and in photography, the negative is not the “real”, the image produced from it is.) Also, I do not understand his distinction (234) between painting/architecture/poetry/movies. How does painting not lend itself to simultaneous collective experience, when the rest do? It seems to me that architecture is obviously an experience limited by space (how may an fit in the building or view it from outside), epic poetry would be limited by one’s hearing range, and movies would be limited by how many can view he screen at once (movies, however, seem a more valid point as many legitimate copies can be made and viewed by millions simultaneously…). I feel like I’m missing his “big picture” on this.
Benjamin’s article is about the advent of mechanical reproduction and how it changed the way we experience art. Benjamin begins the article by distinguishing mechanical reproduction from primeval replicas, and explains the concept of “aura” by claiming that “even the most perfect reproduction of a work of art is lacking in one element: its presence in time and space, its unique existence at the place where it happens to be” (220). He then goes into the concepts of cult value vs. exhibition value. While I understand Benjamin’s claim that artwork has evolved from containing value it its unique time and space to being widely available to everyone, I’m unsure whether or not he deems this a positive or negative evolution. Benjamin offers statues of gods only accessible to priests, certain Madonnas which remain covered most of the year, and sculptures on medieval cathedrals that are invisible to ground-level spectators as examples of how artwork with cult value emphasize its existence, not its “being on view”. Today with mechanical reproduction, artwork and images are easily reproduced and made available for everyone to see, but the “aura” is lost in the process. Is Benjamin suggesting that the unique time and place of a piece of art is what makes it valuable? Has mechanical reproduction undermined the importance of artwork, or has it been beneficial by allowing art to be dispersed and appreciated by the public?
I found Benjamin Walter’s the Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction share some similar ideas as Dr. Nadin’s The Civilization of Illiteracy. Yet they have some ideas that are opposed to each others. I’ve recently been asked by Dr. Nadin to watch a few videos online. The conclusion I got out of them demonstrated the author’s point even though they are animations instead of film: “…film. Its social significance, …, is inconceivable without its destructive, cathartic aspect, that is, the liquidation of the traditional value of the cultural heritage.” Here is the link to those videos: http://blogs.walkerart.org/offcenter/2007/07/16/cao-feis-imirror/ . I’ve always found that the so-called “global village” concept idealized the constraining of cultures of weaker/ smaller countries. And from these videos, it is clear how big of an influence Hollywood and Japanese animations are to the rest of the world. The artist who created the videos is Chinese. Yet if I did not know her name or the love/hate emotion Chinese have toward western countries, I would’ve guessed that she was Japanese. It is a sad side effect that people of not-so-advanced countries worship countries that are powerful in any way. And they are so eager to catch up, they abandoned their own true identify.
When the author stated that the key difference between the original and the reproduction is the authenticity, the first thing I thought about was Dr. Nadin’s claim that nothing is authentic anymore with today’s technology. When one is “creating” something with the help of other people’s invention, he is borrowing that inventor’s intelligence and importing that “idea” into his own work. So with this theory, there probably has never been an authentic art work since human beings learned to doodle on the ground with a stick.
I also had a little problem with the author’s metaphor when he compared painter/ camera men to magician/ surgeon. To me, when one is healing the other, he is working on something (or someone) that already exists. What is happening is patching up and fixing with the help of technology. But when one is painting or shooting a film, what happens is that he is working on “creating” something with the help of existing materials or technology. They are fundamentally different and should not be compared to each other.
As for Bill Nicole’s article, some of his theories I found pushy. But I did like the last portion where he explained why wars are beautiful. It was daunting. But interesting and surprising correct, however twisted it sounds.
Benjamin’s stance on the authenticity of the media was very interesting. I wonder what his opinion would be on the act of painting, as opposed to the painting itself. Where does the art lie? I think he’s stated that it’s not the intention of the painter to produce a work that will be seen by a collective of people . . . but I’m not sure what he means by “organize and control themselves in their perception.” (235)
Benjamin believes that while art has always been able to be reproduced in one way of another, the ability to reproduce and the ease in which it can be done has had a tremendous impact on the art itself, and how it is viewed. Nicols takes this notion a step further when he speaks of the movement beyond mechanical reproduction. He addresses the new era of cybernetic systems, including, digital reproduction, intelligent machines, and ultimately system that people interact with, and not just observe. Because of the ease of reproductive technologies, art and its very nature are become increasingly interactive. As Benjamin believes in the power of the mechanical reproduction forcing its impact into the psyche of the viewer, Nichols speaks of the power of the cybernetic systems forcing its way into the psyche of the creator. I also wonder where Nichols feels the art lies, if looking at the ACT of painting as opposed to the outcome.
I also wonder if there is a conscience movement in the modern creation of specific art forms (namely video games) to actively use cybernetic systems to move AWAY from reproduction. It seems to me that there is has been a very distinct decision made to (even though the actual product is reproduced exactly) make a point that everyone who views the piece will have a completely different interactive experience, and therefore will see a completely different piece of art than the next person. Wouldn’t it be because of the ability to reproduce these pieces that they are able to be completely unlike their identical copies?
In The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, Walter Benjamin focuses on perspectives of art in a new age. Looking back in history, he observes that “a work of art has always been reproducible,” at least to some extent (218). Duplicates of paintings, for example, would have never been as well done as the original. While they might be well done in themselves, there was soma aura about the original that made it unique. This idea of uniqueness versus similarity is analogous to the uniqueness of human beings. While there may be two human beings that act alike and look alike, they are not the same person. Each has qualities lacking in the other, however ineffable they may be.
But what of the age of reproducible art? By this we must draw a distinction between art that can be manually reproduced, in which the reproduction lacks a certain quality, and art that can be truly reproduced. This latter form of art has “true” reproducibility, where a copy is the same as another copy, and the original is the same as the first copy. In fact, it is here where the very idea of “the original” dissolves. If the original is exactly the same as the copy, there is no original, because there is no distinguishing it from the others. The very idea of original breaks down in this new landscape: “the presence of the original is the prerequisite to the concept of authenticity” (220). Where there is no original, there need not be a concept of authenticity to distinguish copy from original.
Digital media, of course, is currently the only way for true reproducibility to take place. As it permeates culture, it will be interesting to see how culture responds to this new paradigm, which is surely one of many. If “mechanical reproduction of art changes the reaction of the masses toward art,” how will the concept of art change in the future (234)? Will the idea of an original exist at all, even towards older forms of media?
According to Walter Benjamin, mechanical reproduction destroys the “aura,” authenticity and authority of the work of art by depreciating its “historical testimony.” (p221) Mechanical reproduction transforms the nature of the art by allowing it to not be based on cult values and rituals but on exhibition values and politics. (p227) Technology with its machinery, and film by its “new structural formulation of the subject” (p237) give the public a new sight of reality, change the reaction of the masses, and therefore transform modes of participation and reception (communication). (p239)
Bill Nichols, on the other hand, shifts the attention to the digital era where computers and cybernetic systems are shaping new ways to perceive and adjusts our sense of self and reality. We are now living in the society of simulacrum and are being defined in relationship to cybernetic systems and computers. “Real” is now being viewed in relationship to a movie or a game. In fact the real experiences feel odd and less satisfying at times. A tourist in Paris and Hawaii will constantly compare her observations with the prior simulations of that location, often stating phrases like “it looks like that movie.” Nichols seems to be suggesting that simulated situations are more gratifying due to hyper-reality and our limited control over them. He mentions Baudriallard remarks that when we perceive real as simulation, real becomes problematic: “by dint of being more real than the real itself, reality is destroyed.”
I agree with Nichols that in cybernetic systems and applications (VR, Cyborgs, etc.) the process of logical simulation and illusion of control becomes the object of masculine fetishisation (e.g. The Stepford Wives movie), but I have difficulty accepting that the voyeuristic gaze is completely circumvented in these systems. Haven’t we applied all sorts of gender roles to games, and online virtual environments? And aren’t there an abundance of sex and porn simulators already? I don’t think that gender politics and sexual coding of gaze in mass communication technologies have changed much since mechanical reproduction.
As Nichols suggests, the new digital technologies has raised many financial, ethical, and political questions which need to be addressed before we get immersed in the possibilities of the new tools or get consumed by them. Also, isn’t the digital era by transforming modes of communication becoming cult based and ritualistic again?
Benjamin asks what the reproductive quality of film and photography have done to the definition of art. Nichols seems to advance on this notion of re-defining and ask what the computer-age has done to the definition of self and reality.
Duchamp’s urinal artwork seems to be an act born out of the cyber-times even though it was attributed with what dadaist movement (which Benjamin said was a precursor to the technology of film). Nichols says the digital era has placed importance on the process, rather than the product. Duchamp’s urinal seems to exist in a area between process and product; emphasizing the artistic process in relation to something that was produced, injecting an aura back into an inanimate object.
Documentary film presupposes a certain degree of truth. When they were first created they were mainly used for propaganda. The ‘truth’ that was shown was that of the creator. Early documentary creators thought editing had to be employed to juxtapose scenes in a way that would allow viewers to see a deeper truth. This ‘deeper truth’ could not be viewed by the human eye, it had to be seen through the considerably more capable machine-eye. Documentary makers took it as their duty to educate the masses. These films showed the complexities and wonders of whatever political body was currently in place. The reproduction of film made an art form that was employed directly for political purposes. Creators saw it as the perfect way to reach the public, and foster a revolution. Art became subservient to politics.
In the age of the Internet we now see 30 second clips of police knocking someone off their bike in New York, or something similar. These clips contain no context to other clips, and ask us to view and contemplate them without reference to outside influence – like we would a painting. This clip is considerably less artistic than any shot seen in a documentary. It could be a cheap phone camera, and its recording is entirely political, yet we relate to it in a more contemplative way because there is so much untold. It is seen outside of any narrative structure. The viewer can side with the police or with the biker, and this decision is made with the gut, outside of logic. This puts the viewer in a privileged position above the event, much like an art piece would. Each person leaves with their own interpretation.
Early documentary creators wanted to show a mechanical, indexation recording of what was correct. They did so, but employed editing to display what they thought was ‘correct’. This mindset may have been born out of film, but it is not innate to film. Short clips, without context show us this. Many people watch video’s and consider their authenticity – if they are a hoax, like viral video’s, or if they were made in earnest. There seems to be a fuzzy line between art and actual that we can’t fully define. Many viewers of youtube’s Dax Flame think he’s a real person, many think he’s a fake (which he is).
In Bejamin’s writing we are asked what art is, and he explains its a bad question as ‘art’ needs redefining with this new age. In Nichols’s writing we are asked what reality is. There also seems to be a strange interrelation between the two readings that doesn’t just show a purely evolutionary trend, but I can’t really grasp it.